The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief by Atkinson, C. J.
 1 
***This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology. 
Please cite the published version when available. *** 
THE AIM OF BELIEF AND SUSPENDED BELIEF 
ABSTRACT:  In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of 
the ‘aim’ of belief—both the teleological and normative interpretations—have the 
resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief 
(suspension). I argue that, despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these 
theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we 
must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, 
or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able to account 
for suspension. To close, I briefly consider some of the reasons we have in favour 
of pursing each of these options, and I suggest that it is worth exploring the 
possibility that suspension is best understood as its own attitude, independently 
of theories of belief’s ‘aim’. 
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THE AIM OF BELIEF AND SUSPENDED BELIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
Teleological and normative theories of belief currently dominate debates 
about the nature of belief. Both accounts, which offer different 
interpretations of Bernard William’s (1973: Ch. 9) remark that ‘beliefs aim 
at truth’, hope to explain certain descriptive and normative features of 
belief. The teleologists achieve this by appealing to a genuine aim or telos, 
commonly said to be the truth; and the normativists achieve the same by 
appealing to a normative requirement, also commonly said to be truth. In 
this respect, the teleologists interpret William’s claim quite literally: there 
really is an aim of belief; while the normativists take a metaphorical 
approach—talk about the ‘aim’ of belief stands in for what is actually a 
normative requirement.1 
In this paper, I do not assess the merits of these theories as theories of 
outright belief. Instead, I assess how and whether they can be extended to 
account for another doxastic attitude: suspended belief (suspension). The 
underlying assumption is that any comprehensive theory of belief should 
also provide the basis for a theory of suspension—an assumption shared by 
at least some teleologists and normativists, such as Ernest Sosa (2010) and 
Pascal Engel (2013a), whose work I discuss later. However, as I will argue, 
the efforts of these theorists to extend their theories of belief to suspension 
fail. This leaves us with two options: either we must find alternative (or 
differently elaborated) theories of belief that can account for suspension, or 
we must abandon our initial assumption that they ought to be able to—
perhaps suspension is just an altogether different kind of attitude. 
                                                        
1 Influential teleologists include McHugh (2011, 2012), Sosa (2010), Steglich-Petersen (2006, 2009), and 
Velleman (2000). Influential normativists include Boghossian (1989, 2003), Engel (2005, 2007, 2013a, 
2013b), Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Wedgwood (2002, 2007, 2013), and Whiting (2010). 
For a useful collection of papers on the topic see Chan (2013). 
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In Section 1, I begin by outlining the features of suspension that are central 
to this discussion. These are features that, I suggest, any plausible theory of 
suspension must be able to explain. In Section 2, I argue that both the 
teleological and normative theories of belief fail to account for these 
features. And in Section 3, I close the discussion with some tentative 
remarks about whether we really should expect theories of belief to account 
for suspension. In general, my hope is to draw attention to the fact that 
considerably more work is to be done if we wish to establish the place of 
suspension in a contemporary theoretical framework.2 
1. SOME FEATURES OF SUSPENSION 
Like outright beliefs, suspension has its own descriptive and normative 
features, that we should expect any theory of suspension to explain. 
Descriptively, we want to know what suspension is (in contrast to other 
attitudes); and normatively we want to know when (if ever) it is appropriate 
to suspend. 
To begin with the descriptive features, it is important to realise that 
suspension is an attitude, distinct from the mere absence or lack of a belief 
(following Friedman, I call this absence a ‘non-belief’). Friedman (2013) 
make this clear with a number of illuminating examples. For example, 
despite holding no belief on such matters, we were not born suspending 
about ‘whether bumblebees hibernate during the winter’, and cavemen 
were not suspending about ‘whether the Large Hadron Collider would find 
the Higgs boson’ (p. 168). Hence, there is more to suspension than the 
absence of belief—indeed, ‘even rocks and numbers’ are in that state, as 
Ralph Wedgwood (2002, p. 272) has observed. 
                                                        
2 Jane Friedman (2013, 2017) makes steps in this direction with her recent, in depth inquiries into the 
nature of suspension. A number of important points in this paper draw on her efforts. 
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This suggests that theories of suspension must be able to say something 
about what suspension is—as an attitude—insofar as this attitude is distinct 
form other attitudes and, moreover, from the mere absence of belief. 
Moving onto suspension’s normative features, we should expect our theory 
to tell us something about when it is appropriate to suspend. If we reflect 
for a moment on the different normative requirements of suspension and 
belief, it is apparent that there are times when suspension is (and is not) an 
appropriate attitude to hold. Consider that when your evidence for p and 
for not-p is unclear, such that neither p nor not-p can be established with 
any confidence, then it is not appropriate to form an outright belief in either 
p or not-p; rather, suspension is appropriate. While, conversely, when your 
evidence is sufficiently strong to support p (or not-p), then an outright belief 
that p (or not-p) is appropriate, and suspension (ordinarily) is not.3 These 
are some of the basic normative requirements of suspension. In particular, 
we can note that suspension is subject to its own normative requirements, 
and these requirements are not equivalent to those we would typically 
associate with outright belief. 
To summarise, as a minimum, theories of suspension should be able to 
account for:  
i.  The descriptive features of suspension, such that we can distinguish 
suspension from other attitudes and non-belief. 
And, 
                                                        
3 There is perhaps some overlap between the normativity of belief and suspension, such that 
believing that p and suspending towards p can occasionally both be appropriate under the same 
conditions. This seems to be a consequence of new forms of limited pragmatism about belief, such as 
McHugh’s (2012, 2015). According to such theories, the evidence for p can be sufficient for belief, but 
we might nonetheless suspend toward p for pragmatic reasons. In this sense, pragmatic reasons can 
(at least on occasion) have the final say on whether we believe that p or suspend toward p. As it 
happens, this kind of pragmatism presents the teleologists with a problem when it comes to 
explaining suspension, which I will get to later. However, for now, my point is just that the normative 
features of belief and suspension cannot be identical. I expect that even the pragmatist would agree 
that if the evidence supported p beyond all doubt (e.g. with Cartesian certainty), then belief (and not 
suspension) would be appropriate. 
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ii.  The normative features of suspension, such that we have some 
understanding of the conditions under which it is appropriate to 
suspend. 
Any theory that fails on either of these counts thereby fails as a theory of 
suspension. In the following section, I outline teleological and normative 
theories of belief, and I argue that they fall short as theories of suspension 
in both of these important respects. Moreover, this remains the case even 
when these theories are explicitly extended to account for suspension. 
2. THEORIES OF BELIEF AND SUSPENSION 
Teleological theories of belief hold that beliefs are characterised by a 
genuine aim. This aim is typically explained in terms of the mechanisms 
involved in belief formation and maintenance, which are said (in some 
sense) to aim at the truth. At the intentional level, in doxastic deliberation, 
the aim is usually said to manifest in our intention to believe only truths; 
and at the subintentional level (as not all beliefs are formed intentionally), 
it is said to manifest in our underlying cognitive mechanisms, which 
regulate for truth. The teleologists then appeal to this aim to explain the 
descriptive and normative features of belief.4 
To be precise, the teleological thesis can be stated as follows: 
Teleological Thesis: A propositional attitude φ is a belief if and only if φ 
aims (in virtue of the mechanisms involved in belief formation and 
maintenance) to have content p only if p.5 
                                                        
4 It is sometimes added that the truth-directed mechanisms involved in belief production have most 
likely arisen as the result of natural selection (e.g. see Steglich-Petersen 2006, p. 510, and Velleman 
2000, p. 253, fn. 18). This is in keeping with the naturalistic tendencies of the teleologists. 
Nevertheless, we don’t need to be committed naturalists to be teleologists—perhaps God created us 
with truth-directed belief forming mechanisms. 
5 Not all teleologists (listed in fn. 1) explicitly commit to this statement of the teleological thesis, 
however it captures what I believe most teleologists would be happy to agree with. An exception is 
McHugh (2011), who suggests that knowledge, and not (merely) truth, is the aim of belief. Nonetheless, 
since McHugh takes the truth aim to be ‘derivative from’ the knowledge aim, the truth aim is still at 
least a necessary feature of belief on his account (p. 382). 
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This thesis asserts that belief just is the attitude that aims at the truth; this is 
how we satisfy the descriptive goal of demarcating beliefs from other 
attitudes. And the normativity of belief is explained in instrumental terms, 
such that true beliefs are correct because they achieve belief’s aim, and 
believing according to our evidence is rational because evidence indicates 
truth.6 
As for normative theories of belief, the central claim is that beliefs are 
essentially norm- (in contrast to aim-) governed. This norm, as with the 
alleged aim of belief, is usually said to be truth, such that beliefs are subject 
to a truth norm. Both the teleologists and the normativists agree that there 
is an intimate relation between belief and truth, however they disagree 
about the essence of this relation. For the normativists, the truth-centric 
nature and normativity of belief cannot be reduced to descriptive properties 
of believers—i.e., to the mechanisms of believers that regulate for truth. 
Instead, they hold that beliefs can only be properly understood by appeal 
to a distinctly normative component, such that believers are subject to a 
requirement to believe only truths, independently of what believers are 
actually doing. 
It turns out to be quite difficult to pin down an exact formulation of the 
‘normative thesis’, as we have for the teleological thesis, which is agreeable 
to most normativists. This is because normative theories have become 
extremely complex and multifaceted in response to various objections, 
arguably much more so than their teleological counterparts.7 For this 
reason, I will simply stipulate that I am interested in the following version 
of the normative thesis, with a few words of justification to follow:  
                                                        
6 Of course, there is a lot of debate about the plausibility of this thesis, with two notable objections 
raised by Owens (2003) and Shah (2003). For developments in the literature following Owens’ 
objection, see [Author Removed], McHugh (2012, 2015), Steglich-Petersen (2009, 2017), and Sullivan-
Bissett & Noordhof (2013, 2017); and for developments following Shah’s objection see Shah & 
Velleman (2005) and Steglich-Petersen (2006). For my purposes, I overlook these important 
discussions here, as I am interested in whether this thesis can account for suspension, and not in the 
plausibility of the thesis per se. 
7 For two influential objections to normativism, see Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi (2007), 
and Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (2009). 
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Normative Thesis: A propositional attitude φ is a belief if and only if there 
is a normative requirement to hold φ with content p only if p. 
For the most part, I take this thesis to be neutral between various different 
interpretations of normativism. In particular, it takes no stand on whether 
the ‘normative requirement’ is a prescription, a permission, or an ideal.8 It 
also only makes truth a necessary condition for correct belief, which I 
believe most normativists would agree with, even though some would 
argue that beliefs should additionally be justified or amount to knowledge.9 
With the teleological and normative theses clearly stated, we can now begin 
to focus on the central question of this paper, which is whether these 
theories have the resources to account for suspension. 
2.1. DIRECT APPLICATION OF THESES TO SUSPENSION 
It is immediately evident that, when taken at face value, the teleological and 
normative theses do not tell us anything interesting about suspension. As 
theories of outright belief, neither has the resources to directly account for 
the nature and normativity of suspension, as they have been outlined 
above. Bernard Mayo (1963-4) first took note of this contention with early 
normative theories of belief. He wrote: 
‘An immediate consequence of the thesis that believing is what it is fitting 
to do with a truth is… [that] one ought never to suspend judgment, since 
there is nothing that it is right not to believe, except the false, the negation 
of which, being true, one ought to believe.’ (Mayo 1963-4, p. 144) 
From Mayo’s perspective, the problem is that the proposed normativity of 
belief leaves no room for suspension. If truth is the only thing ‘fitting’ for 
belief, then it is never appropriate to suspend. This leaves us with a 
problem: when the relationship between belief and truth is stated in this 
                                                        
8 The norm is a prescription for Boghossian (1989), (2003); Shah (2003); Shah & Velleman (2005); and 
Wedgwood (2002). For Whiting (2010) it is a permission. And for Engel (2013a) it is an ideal. For a 
general survey of issues surrounding normativism about belief, see McHugh and Whiting (2014). 
9 For instance, Engel (2005) takes knowledge to be the most fundamental norm of belief.  
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way, suspension is excluded from the scope of the theory—a problem that 
appears to remain in light of our more recent theories of belief. 
For the normativists, both their descriptive and normative projects fail, 
because suspension is simply not the attitude that we are required to hold 
‘with content p only if p’. That would be a very strange requirement to set 
for suspension. And the same is true for the teleologists, since it would be 
equally as strange to suggest that, when we suspend, we do so with the aim 
to suspend towards p only if p. Indeed, insofar as these theories are 
plausible, the conditions they set are far more congenial to outright beliefs, 
which should not be too surprising, given that they were originally 
intended as theories of outright belief, not suspension. To recognise this is 
really just to acknowledge that belief and suspension are not exactly the 
same attitude, so they cannot be explained in exactly the same terms. 
Nonetheless, Mayo’s objection has important implications; it implies that 
any theorists who draw such a close connection between belief and truth, 
as the teleologists and normativists do, have more work to do when it comes 
to accounting for suspension. Their theories do not get a free pass in this 
regard. 
That bring us to the next question: can the necessary work be done in order 
to make these theories account for suspension? To this end, the first thing 
to notice is that neither the teleological nor the normative thesis 
categorically rules out suspension. Given that each thesis is formulated with 
truth as a necessary (and not sufficient) condition for belief, neither 
prohibits suspension toward p even when p is true.10 In fact, according to 
each thesis, suspension is always allowed, in any situation. This point, in 
itself, doesn’t tell us anything interesting about suspension, for it is also true 
of imagining that p, desiring that p, and even non-belief in p, etc.—none of 
                                                        
10 It is generally recognised that truth cannot be a sufficient condition for belief, whether beliefs are 
construed as teleological or normative. In the teleological case, this would mean that we have the 
impossible aim to believe all truths—an aim which we clearly do not possess (Sullivan-Bissett and 
Noordhof 2013). And in the normative case, this would mean that we are subject to the impossible 
requirement to believe all truths, which violates the principle of ought-implies-can (Boghossian 2003; 
Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007).  
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these attitudes are ruled out by the aim or norm of belief. Nevertheless, it 
does mean that there is room for a logically consistent account of 
suspension to be subsumed under either thesis. In this way, it is perhaps 
possible to derive an aim or norm of suspension from a more fundamental 
aim or norm of belief, thus demonstrating that the teleological or the 
normative thesis can be extended to provide a theory of suspension. 
In the following two subsections, I turn my attention to two attempts to 
show that the teleological and normative theses do, in fact, give rise to their 
own aim and norm of suspension. Sosa (2010) defends a teleological 
account, and Engel (2013a) defends a normative account. For the reasons to 
be discussed, I suggest that both of these theorists fail in their respective 
efforts to establish a plausible theory of suspension. 
2.2. SOSA ON SUSPENSION: A TELEOLOGICAL READING 
Sosa (2010) takes believing to be a kind of performance, with an aim, like 
any other aim-motivated behaviour. For this reason, he regularly draws 
analogies between the aim of belief and other, more ordinary, aims. One 
analogy he makes extensive use of, and which we will focus on here, is 
between belief’s aim and the aim of a hunter stalking his prey. It is through 
this analogy that Sosa hopes to show how a teleological account of belief 
can give rise to a similarly teleological account of suspension. 
To see how this works, we can begin by reflecting on Sosa’s (2010, pp. 5-7) 
analysis of the hunter. The first thing to notice is that, in the act of hunting, 
the hunter has two related aims. He has the primary aim to hit his target, and 
he has the secondary aim to choose his shots well. The first of these aims 
requires the hunter to have a good shot, if he is to demonstrate his 
competence. This means that when the hunter shoots, he must be able to hit 
his targets with some sufficient level of consistency. In this respect, when 
we assess the hunter’s performance, we do so based on his ability to satisfy 
this primary aim. However, with this primary aim, comes the secondary 
aim. To be a good hunter, the hunter must also choose to shoot at the right 
 10 
time—that is, he must choose his shots well. (It is quite possible for a hunter 
with a good shot to be bad at choosing when to shoot, and vice versa.) To 
thus achieve this secondary aim, the hunter cannot just shoot at random, 
hoping to hit some targets. Rather, he must sometimes forbear from 
shooting. This, of course, will mean that he occasionally misses potential 
targets (due to not shooting); but it will increase his chances of hitting a 
target when he does shoot (that is, of satisfying his primary aim). The 
primary and secondary aims of the hunter are therefore related in the 
following way: the secondary aim is in the service of the primary aim, since 
it is in virtue of trying to competently satisfy the primary aim that the 
hunter has his secondary aim. In turn, given that this secondary aim is 
distinct from the primary aim, it also comes with its own standard of 
assessment (its own normative requirements). We can assess the hunter’s 
performance according to whether he chooses his shots well, in addition to 
whether he has a good shot. Both of these assessments arise due to these 
two respective aims. 
In general, Sosa’s point is that the primary aim to achieve a certain goal 
often comes with a secondary aim, and this secondary aim typically 
involves avoiding failure. The hunter must choose his shots well, such that 
he decreases the chances of failing to satisfy his primary aim. And this, Sosa 
notes, is a common feature of many aim-motivated behaviours, ‘whether 
athletic, artistic, academic, etc.’ (p. 6). From the primary aim to achieve 
success follows the secondary aim to avoid failure. 
The next point to take from Sosa’s analysis is that attempting to avoid 
failure often requires inaction; yet this inaction is still a kind of performance. 
There is a crucial difference between aim-motivated inaction and mere 
inaction. Consider again the hunter: when he assesses a shot situation, and 
decides that now is not a good time to shoot, his decision not to act is 
intentional. By carrying out his secondary aim (to avoid failing to hit his 
target), the hunter, in Sosa’s words, ‘intentionally and even deliberately 
forbear[s]’ from taking a shot (p. 6). In contrast, if he doesn’t take a shot 
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because he has, say, fallen asleep, his inaction is not aim-motivated (Sosa’s 
example, p. 6)—in this respect, his inaction is not intentional.11 Accordingly, 
then, an instance of inaction may or may not be aim-motivated. The 
important thing to note is that when inaction is aim-motivated, the aim 
involved is just like any other aim: it gives rise to all of the usual dimensions 
of instrumental normativity that we should expect from an aim. This allows 
us to assess how well inaction is achieved, in instrumental terms, when that 
instance of inaction is aim-motivated (we might ask: did the hunter choose 
not to act at the right time?). 
That gives us the two important insights that we need to take from Sosa. 
The first is that aim-motivated behaviours often have two related aims. 
There is the primary aim to achieve success in a certain domain, and this is 
typically related to a secondary aim to avoid failure. The second is that 
inaction, which is often the result of attempting to satisfy a secondary aim, 
can be genuinely aim-motivated, and can therefore be subject to the same 
criteria of assessment as other aims. With these two points in mind, we can 
begin to see how Sosa’s teleological account of suspension develops. In 
essence, Sosa suggests that suspension is the doxastic analogue of aim-
motivated inaction, such that the aim of suspension derives from the more 
fundamental aim of belief. 
To go into detail, as we have seen, the (primary) aim of belief is to believe 
only truths. In line with Sosa’s analysis, we can say that this aim gives rise 
to a secondary aim, which is to avoid failure (in this case, to avoid failing to 
believe only truths). Suspension is then associated with this secondary aim, 
in the following way. If we cannot establish the truth of either p or not-p, 
then we avoid failing to believe only truths by intentionally forbearing from 
belief. The hope is then that this intentional forbearance from belief enables 
us to characterise the nature and normativity of suspension (for ease of 
expression, I will sometimes refer to this as ‘doxastic forbearance’). The idea 
                                                        
11 The hunter’s decision to go to sleep might’ve been intentional, but his inaction with respect to 
taking a particular shot while he is asleep is not.  
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is that we can distinguish suspension from other attitudes and non-belief 
on account of suspension being uniquely subject to this aim, and we can 
explain the appropriateness of suspension in instrumental terms (we can 
ask whether a subject carried out this aim well). The result is that, from the 
aim of belief, we can derive an aim of suspension, such that the teleological 
theory of belief gives rise to a closely related teleological theory of 
suspension. What we want to know now is whether this theory of 
suspension is going to work. 
To assess the merits of this proposal, it helps to first recognise that, if this 
teleological account of suspension is to be successful, it must make the aim 
of suspension both a necessary and sufficient condition for an attitude to 
count as suspension (just as the aim of belief is said to be both necessary and 
sufficient for belief). It must be necessary, otherwise there could be 
instances of suspension that are not described by the aim; and it must be 
sufficient, because the aim alone is intended to describe suspension. 
However, on closer inspection, it’s difficult to see how this proposal can 
meet either of these requirements. I begin by considering the sufficiency 
condition. 
2.2.1. THE SUFFICIENCY CONDITION 
There is a fairly obvious sense in which we can satisfy this secondary aim 
of belief without entering into a state of suspension. That is when we 
intentionally forbear from holding beliefs on a topic, by simply not 
inquiring into that topic. For instance, we might decide not to inquire at all 
into whether p or we might decide to cease our present inquiry into p. In 
both cases, we can successfully avoid holding false beliefs, by intentionally 
forming no beliefs. However, it would be strange to say that we are 
suspending on the topics that we have decided not to inquire into. It makes 
more sense to say that we remain in a state of non-belief about those 
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topics.12 In a very general sense, then, doxastic forbearance is not sufficient 
for suspension.  
Now, the teleologists will be quick to respond that this initial criticism 
doesn’t undermine Sosa’s central claim. This is because the kind of doxastic 
forbearance that Sosa is talking about is not completely general, but is 
restricted to a certain domain. To reflect again on Sosa’s example of the 
hunter. The hunter might decide not to go hunting, or he might decide to 
cease presently hunting, and thus forbear from shooting any targets; but 
this kind of forbearance is not what Sosa has in mind. The hunter’s decision 
not to hunt is not motivated by his aims as a hunter—that is, by his aim to 
hit his target or to choose his shot well. These aims only arise within the 
context of the hunt (i.e. while he is actively hunting), and not when he has 
already decided that he will not take part in the hunt. This is apparent when 
we consider how we would assess the hunter’s ability as a hunter: we 
would base our decision on whether the hunt is going well when he is 
hunting, and not on whether he decided to go hunting or not. The thought 
is that something similar is true of suspension. As the hunter’s aims (as a 
hunter) occur within the restricted context of the hunt, the proposed aim of 
suspension only occurs within the context of doxastic deliberation (that is, 
the analogue of the hunt). When we avoid inquiry, we do not ‘activate’ the 
aim of suspension (so to speak), but instead give it up in favour of some 
other pursuit. The kind of doxastic forbearance that is relevant, therefore, 
does not include intentional forbearance from inquiry, but is the kind of 
intentional forbearance that results within doxastic deliberation; that is, 
when we are actively involved in belief formation and maintenance. Thus, 
it is within this more restricted domain that we must focus our criticism, as 
                                                        
12 Friedman (2013, p. 170) makes a similar point regarding ceasing to inquire. She observes that 
finishing considering a proposition is not sufficient for suspension, for we might become distracted 
during our deliberations and thus stop thinking about that proposition. In this sense, we might 
already be inquiring into a proposition, and intentionally stop inquiring, yet not enter into a state of 
suspension. 
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it is only within the context of doxastic deliberation that the aim of 
suspension is said to have a role.  
Focusing our analysis accordingly, then, does Sosa’s account fare 
 any better? I think not. Even within doxastic deliberation, it’s difficult to 
see why doxastic forbearance would always give rise to suspension. One 
concern is that, for the proposal to hold, the relation between doxastic 
forbearance and suspension must be one of conceptual or metaphysical 
necessity. It cannot be the case that sometimes doxastic forbearance gives 
rise to suspension and sometimes it does not, as a matter of contingent 
psychological fact. If this were the case, then, of course, doxastic 
forbearance would not be sufficient for suspension, as there would be the 
possibility of instances of doxastic forbearance that do not amount to 
suspension. But this is not the result that the teleologists are after. They are 
not making a contingent claim about human psychology—they want a 
sufficient condition for all possible instances of suspension. However, it’s 
dubious to suppose that doxastic forbearance necessitates suspension in 
this way. At least, it seems conceivable that a subject could intentionally 
forbear from belief, and yet not enter into a state of suspension.  
For example, we can imagine a race of creatures who, upon concluding that 
their evidence for p and for not-p is inconclusive, intentionally drop all 
doxastic attitudes towards p, and instead return to a prior state of non-belief 
about p. These creatures, call them Deliberites (some say they are the distant 
cousins of Jonathan Bennett’s (1990) Credamites), could have evolved (or 
perhaps have been programmed) not to hold indeterminate doxastic 
attitudes towards propositions. In this respect, they are an all or nothing type 
of creature when it comes to belief. When they deliberate what to believe, if 
they take the evidence to sufficiently support p, they go ahead and (just as 
we do) believe that p—and they may even do so by carrying out an aim to 
believe only truths. However, when they determine that the evidence is not 
sufficient to support either p or not-p, they finalise their deliberation by 
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intentionally dropping any kind of doxastic attitude toward p, and then 
move on to whatever it is they are planning to deliberate next. The 
Deliberites might at some point find themselves deliberating the same 
proposition on multiple occasions, because circumstances might motivate 
them to do so; but for some period of time after concluding their 
deliberation, they intentionally put themselves into a state of non-belief. 
The relation they then have toward the proposition that they forbear from 
believing, is thus equivalent to the caveman’s non-belief about the Higg’s 
boson.  
At this point, it might be questioned whether such creatures are really 
possible. It isn’t entirely clear that we (as human deliberators) could 
intentionally force ourselves into a state of non-belief about p after 
concluding a process of deliberation. Having considered the evidence, and 
having made up our mind (at least for the time being), it seems like we 
would be in quite a different position than the caveman who has never 
considered p. However, while this has some plausibility as a psychological 
claim about humans, that is, at best, all it appears to be—a contingent claim 
about our psychology, rather than a conceptual or metaphysical truth about 
what it means to suspend. In contrast, the Deliberites are, under the same 
conditions, able to intentionally enter into a state of non-belief, because (we 
can suppose) their psychology is completely different from ours. This 
possibility is perhaps easiest to see if we imagine the Deliberites as complex 
machines that have been programmed to consider various propositions as 
they present to the system, one after another, and to assess their truth.13 They 
have the ability to then assign truth values (i.e. T or F) to the propositions 
considered, based on the evidence supporting those propositions, but they 
have no option for an indeterminate state. If they determine the truth value 
for the proposition to be T, they believe it; if F, then they don’t believe it (i.e. 
                                                        
13 How the propositions ‘present to the system’ will depend on the system. For instance, the machine 
could receive perceptual inputs from the environment which prompt deliberation; it could be 
responding to a pre-programmed list of propositions; or it could be responding to information that 
a programmer inputs manually. 
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they believe its negation); but in the case of a proposition for which the 
evidence is indeterminate, any reference to that proposition in the operating 
system of the machine is dropped—i.e., they return to the state they were 
in before they deliberated it; a state equivalent to the non-belief of the 
caveman. If this is conceivable, as I think it is, then intentional forbearance 
from belief is not sufficient to give rise to suspension. 
Another problem for this account of suspension is that doxastic forbearance 
is not a fine-grained enough condition to distinguish suspension from 
another closely related attitude. The difficulty here depends on a distinction 
between suspension and (what we can call) withheld assent.14 In the 
Introduction to his translation of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 
Benson Mates (1996, p. 32) touches on the idea that when a subject suspends 
belief (or ‘suspends judgment’ in his terminology), this seems to suggest 
that the subject understands the proposition in question, but has not yet 
made up his mind about whether the evidence is strong enough to believe 
it; however, when a subject withholds assent from a proposition, this could 
be because he simply does not understand the proposition and for that 
reason is unable to form a belief, independently of the evidence that is 
available to him. To again use Friedman’s example, consider the scientist 
who is deliberating whether to believe the proposition that the Large Hadron 
Collider will find the Higgs boson. Presumably, the scientist understands what 
it means for this proposition to be true or false. He understands what 
evidence is relevant to the truth of the proposition, what the implications of 
the veracity of the proposition are, etc. In this sense, when he decides to 
intentionally forbear from belief, he makes an informed decision. Now, 
contrast this with a non-scientist who, let’s suppose, doesn’t understand the 
proposition in question. The non-scientist might spend some time trying to 
figure out what it means for the Large Hadron Collider to find the Higgs 
boson (what it means for that proposition to be true). Nonetheless, he might 
                                                        
14 Where ‘assent’ is understood to mean mental assent (as opposed to public assent). As a reviewer 
has kindly pointed out, one can mentally assent to p but wish not to publicly assent to p (or vice 
versa) for various pragmatic reasons. 
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ultimately realise that he is simply unable to grasp the proposition (he 
doesn’t have the necessary scientific knowledge), and on that basis 
intentionally forbear from holding a belief on the matter. In this way, there 
is (arguably) an important difference between the attitude of the scientist 
and that of the non-scientist, even though they both intentionally forbear 
from believing the same proposition. On the one hand, the scientist holds 
an informed attitude, while, on the other, the non-scientist is, in the 
Pyrrhonian sense, ‘at a loss’.15 
For the purpose of this discussion, the implication is that two distinct 
attitudes can, in principle, arise from doxastic forbearance. The first 
requires some level of understanding, and in our terminology fits better 
with the notion of suspension. The second, in contrast, occurs when 
understanding cannot be attained, and this we can call, following Mates, 
‘withheld assent’. The labels we apply here are, to a large extent, not 
important. The point is that there are two logically distinct attitudes, and 
Sosa’s appeal to doxastic forbearance to establish the nature of suspension 
does not distinguish between them. 
In response to this difficulty, there are (broadly) two ways that the 
teleologist can go. They can deny that there is a substantial difference 
between these two attitudes, or they can attempt to show that the 
teleological thesis can account for the difference. 
On the first reply, the teleologist might be reluctant to agree that our theory 
of suspension is obligated to distinguish between suspension and withheld 
assent. It might be suggested that both are similar enough to fall under the 
same label, for whatever reason. However, despite the fact that this 
response would, on the surface, lack philosophical rigour, it would also 
conflict with the general strategy of the teleologists for characterising 
                                                        
15 When making this distinction, Mates (1996, Introduction, §6) points out that, despite contemporary 
discussions, the Sextan Pyrrhonist is better described as someone who withholds assent from all 
propositions, rather than suspends belief. This is because Sextus repeatedly claims, not just to 
disagree with his opponents, but to be completely unable to comprehend what they are trying to say. 
It is for this reason that Sextus always finds himself ‘at a loss’ (aporia). 
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doxastic attitudes. The teleological approach attempts to characterise beliefs 
on the basis of the intentional (and subintentional) responses that we have 
to evidence. Beliefs are distinguished from other attitudes by the unique 
way in which we respond to evidence; we form beliefs by assessing the 
evidence we have for a proposition with the aim of believing the truth. In 
this respect, the teleological account can be understood as an ‘input’ theory 
of belief, since its definition of belief depends on the evidential inputs that 
support beliefs.16 This is important because, from an input perspective, we 
should be able to demarcate suspension from withheld assent, given that 
they are responses to different evidential situations. On the one hand, the 
subject who suspends is able to take the evidence for a proposition into 
account, but forbears from belief because he deems the evidence to be 
insufficient. On the other hand, the subject who withholds assent is unable 
to take evidence into account for the proposition (at least, he cannot directly 
assess the evidence for and against the proposition), since he admits that he 
cannot make sense of the proposition in the first place. From this 
perspective, we should expect ‘input’ methods of defining doxastic 
attitudes to be sensitive to distinctions that can be made based on the 
different types of input that those attitudes receive; such as between 
suspension and withheld assent. 
The second reply accepts that there is a substantial distinction, but argues 
that the teleological thesis can account for it. One suggestion, in this regard, 
is to restrict the teleological thesis to range over only those propositions that 
a deliberator can understand. The derivative aim of suspension would then 
also be restricted to propositions that can be understood, thus 
distinguishing between suspension and withheld assent in line with how I 
have distinguished them. On the one hand, there would be doxastic 
forbearance from propositions that a subject can grasp. This would arise 
                                                        
16 This contrasts with ‘output’ theories of belief, such as functional theories, which characterise beliefs 
according to the outputs (or effects) they produce (i.e. according to their functional role). Functional 
theories of belief have a long and complex history, which I won’t go into here; however for a recent 
and concise statement of a functional theory of belief, see Van Leeuwen (2009). 
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due to the secondary aim of belief, and would amount to suspension. On 
the other hand, there would be doxastic forbearance from propositions 
which a subject cannot grasp, and which would amount to withheld assent. 
This attitude would not have any necessary connection to the (new, 
restricted) aim of belief, and would presumably be characterised by its own 
descriptive and normative features. If the teleologists were to make this 
move, it wouldn’t be without justification. We cannot form an outright 
belief in p when we do not (by our own reckoning) understand p, so there 
is no danger of believing p, in this case, when p is false.17 From this 
perspective, talk about an aim to believe propositions that cannot be 
understood, and a derivative aim to avoid believing false propositions 
which equally cannot be understood, doesn’t make much sense. So, 
arguably, both the aim of belief and the derivative aim of suspension only 
range over propositions that we can understand.18 
Nonetheless, there are a couple of further concerns with this reply. The first 
question is where, on this view, withheld assent fits into the teleologists’ 
scheme. In the same way that there are important relations between belief 
and suspension, there are also important (and similar) relations between 
belief and withheld assent. For instance, holding the belief that p and 
withholding assent in p simultaneously seems impossible, as least 
consciously; and, additionally, believing that p while also withholding 
assent in p would seem to put the believer into some kind of epistemic error. 
This suggests that, while there is an important difference between 
suspension and withheld assent, they should arguably still both fall under 
the same theoretical scheme. In other words, given the close relations 
between belief, suspension, and withheld assent, if we expect our theory of 
belief to account for suspension, then it is reasonable to expect it also to 
account for withheld assent. Restricting beliefs aim to propositions that we 
can understand helps to distinguish suspension from withheld assent, but 
                                                        
17 Thanks to an anonymous review for raising this point. 
18 Notice that this is a claim about the psychological ability of a believer to grasp or understand a 
proposition. It is not the case that the proposition must be necessarily ungraspable.  
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it does so at the expense of evicting withheld assent from its theoretical 
framework. Ultimately, this might not be a fatal blow to the teleologists, 
since they could additionally argue that their theory ought to account for 
suspension, but not withheld assent. Nonetheless, this claim could not be 
taken for granted, so there would still be considerably more work for the 
teleologists to do. 
The second concern, and perhaps the more worrying, is the strength of the 
justification for restricting belief’s aim to propositions that can be 
understood. On first sight, the fact that we are not in danger of violating 
belief’s aim, with regards to propositions that we are unable to believe 
(because we cannot understand them), seems like a good reason to suppose 
that belief’s aim does not apply to such propositions. However, on 
reflection, it’s not clear why the inability to believe a proposition—at least 
at a given time—should have any influence on the scope of belief’s aim. 
While we are unable to believe propositions that we cannot understand 
(and so are not in danger of violating belief’s aim), we are equally unable to 
believe propositions for which we do not have a certain amount of 
evidence—that is, unless we want to accept a fairly radical form of doxastic 
voluntarism. For this reason, limiting belief’s aim to propositions that we 
have the ability to believe would appear to generalise too far. The 
teleologists want to explain belief forming practices; but restricting belief’s 
aim only to propositions that can be believed would require us to leave out, 
not only withheld assent, but also suspension. For there is equally no 
danger of violating belief’s aim when we suspend towards p, on the 
assumption that the evidential situation also rules out forming an outright 
belief in p or not-p.19 
                                                        
19 This touches on another potential difficulty with the teleological thesis generally. The teleological 
approach is, I believe, most promising when it comes to explaining the normative features of outright 
beliefs, and how to distinguish them from other propositional attitudes. Yet there are other 
descriptive features of belief that we might want our theories to explain, such as doxastic 
involuntarism. However, it’s not clear why belief’s aim, when characterised something like an 
ordinary aim, would prevent voluntary control over our beliefs. 
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These considerations suggest that, when we intentionally forbear from 
belief, this does not always result in suspension. As such, it is yet to be 
established that doxastic forbearance can count as a sufficient condition for 
suspension. Moreover, as I argue presently, doxastic forbearance is also 
problematic as a necessary condition for suspension. 
2.2.2. THE NECESSITY CONDITION 
The first problem with the claim that suspension is necessarily subject to the 
proposed aim, arises from a general concern regarding the necessity of 
carrying out aims in order to enter into doxastic states. If we adopt either of 
two main theoretical branches for understanding doxastic attitudes—
representationalism or dispositionalism—it is curious why we would only 
be able to manifest certain doxastic states as the consequence of carrying 
out aims. If the state is a representation or disposition—something distinct 
from the aim itself—then why would we only be able to manifest this state 
by a singular means; that is, only by carrying out a particular aim? In her 
work on suspension, Friedman (2013) develops a related concern through 
her analysis of a proposed ‘consideration condition’, which she assesses as 
a possible necessary condition for suspension. The condition holds that it is 
only by ‘considering, deliberation, wondering, entertaining and so on’ (p. 
171) that we can come to suspend belief. However, as she points out, the 
problem with this condition is that it severely limits the means by which we 
can enter into a state of suspension. In particular, it makes it impossible to 
suspend belief through ‘non-standard means’ (p. 171). The examples of 
non-standard means Friedman offers are being hit over the head, having 
your brain operated on, and even the possibility of a Swampman version of 
yourself spontaneously coming into existence already suspending about all 
kinds of things.20 The difficulty is that in all of these cases, considering a 
proposition is not what takes the subject into a state of suspension—and it 
seems like a parallel case can be made against an ‘intentionality condition’. 
                                                        
20 There is some controversy about whether Swampman really has beliefs. Nonetheless, even if we 
don’t accept Swampman cases, the other examples serve the same purpose. 
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These examples show that we do not need to intentionally forbear from 
belief in order to suspend. If suspension is thought of as a kind of 
representational or dispositional state, much like belief, then it seems 
possible for a neuroscientist to induce such states, quite independently of 
whether you have carried out an aim.21 
The second potential problem arises from the possibility that suspension 
might, on occasion (or, on a more extreme view, always), be guided by aims 
other than the epistemic aim of avoiding false beliefs, as dictated by the aim 
of belief. It has been suggested to varying degrees that suspension might 
not always be to do with the epistemic aims of a believer, but could also be 
to do with their pragmatic aims. 
On the more extreme view, dating back to Pyrrho’s scepticism (as we see it 
through Sextus), suspending belief has to do, fundamentally, with 
achieving ataraxia; that is, a kind of tranquillity or peace of mind. In this 
sense, if we were to interpret this as a teleological claim about the nature of 
suspension, then we would have the result that the aim of suspension is 
primarily pragmatic, and not epistemic. Indeed, the aim of belief could still 
be truth (an aim that is ultimately unachievable according to the 
Pyrrhonists), while the aim of suspension is, independently of that aim, 
pragmatic. We suspend so that we can avoid mental strife. If this kind of 
global pragmatism about suspension is true, then an epistemic aim is 
arguably not the primary aim of suspension, but the aim to have a tranquil 
mind is.  
                                                        
21 It’s worth mentioning that the cases Friedman raises against the necessity of a consideration 
condition for suspension also generalise to outright belief. If suspension can result from non-
standard means, then why not outright belief too? This possibility thus has the potential to create 
problems for teleological theories of belief generally, by detaching the nature of beliefs as 
fundamentally representational or dispositional states, from their proposed teleological cause in the 
agent. To my knowledge, this line of thought as a general critique of the teleological thesis has not 
yet been pursued in the literature, and it would be worth exploring. Nonetheless, for our purposes 
it is enough to note that, even if the teleological thesis holds for outright belief, it does not entail that 
the same is true of suspension. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to elaborate 
on this issue.) 
 23 
Of course, this would be quite an extreme form of pragmatism to adopt, 
and we might not be so inclined to hold that epistemic considerations don’t 
at least have something to do (fundamentally) with suspension. (Perhaps it 
could even be argued that, from a Pyrrhonian perspective, we achieve peace 
of mind (in part) because we don’t have false beliefs, making the aim to avoid 
holding false beliefs a necessary means for achieving a pragmatic end.) 
Nonetheless, we need not adopt such a global form of pragmatism to see 
that pragmatic aims might have a role to play when it comes to suspending, 
independently of belief’s truth aim. For example, Conor McHugh (2012, 
2015), who defends a teleological account of belief, also argues that we can 
(at least sometimes) suspend for pragmatic reasons. This, he argues, is when 
the evidence ‘psychologically allow[s] you to believe a proposition, without 
psychologically compelling you to believe it’ (2015, p. 1122). In this respect, 
the evidential situation allows for the pragmatic aims of a believer to 
influence whether they, all things considered, believe a proposition outright 
or suspend towards that proposition. 
An example McHugh offers involves deliberating about your friend’s guilt 
in a criminal case. Several independent witnesses claim that your friend 
committed a terrible crime, and you have no reason to suspect a conspiracy. 
This gives you, we can assume, sufficient evidence to believe that your 
friend is guilty. However, given that there is some limited chance that the 
witnesses are wrong (or misleading you for whatever reason), you are not 
psychologically compelled to believe in your friend’s guilt. Rather, you are 
able, the claim goes, to suspend belief about it, because you value your 
friendship, and do not want to ruin it if he does turn out to be innocent—
i.e., you can ultimately decide to suspend for pragmatic reasons.22  
On this view, a pragmatic aim has the final say in whether you decide to 
believe in or suspend about your friend’s guilt. In particular, your aim is to 
(say) preserve your friendship. Importantly, this means that your aim is not 
                                                        
22 For this example, see McHugh 2015, p. 1124. 
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to avoid failing to believe the truth—indeed, you take yourself to have 
sufficient reason to believe that your friend is guilty, without falling into 
error. The matter, then, is not error avoidance—the aim which dictates your 
decision to suspend is pragmatic, not epistemic. 
The point is that, if a pragmatic conception of suspension is correct (either 
in a global or more restricted sense), then it is incorrect to suppose, as Sosa 
suggests, that suspension is always guided by the aim of error avoidance. 
From a pragmatic perspective, such as McHugh’s, there are instances of 
suspension that are not characterised by Sosa’s aim of suspension, such that 
this aim is not necessary to all instances of suspension. In this regard, 
McHugh’s account is particularly important, because he explicitly endorses 
truth as the aim of belief, while holding that suspension can be influenced 
by pragmatic aims. 
In summary, Sosa’s attempt to develop the teleological position to account 
for suspension is problematic. It fails to give a sufficient condition for 
suspension, as the aim does not always give rise to suspension; and it is also 
not clear that such an aim is necessary. First, there is a potential disconnect 
between our aims and forming doxastic attitudes, and—at least on 
pragmatic accounts of suspension—there are cases of suspension that are 
not guided by the epistemic aim of avoid false beliefs. As the teleological 
account stands, then, it is unable to account for the descriptive and 
normative features of suspension. 
2.3. ENGEL ON SUSPENSION: A NORMATIVE READING 
That brings us to normative theories of suspension. Beginning with a 
normative interpretation of belief, Engel (2013a) develops and defends 
(albeit briefly) an account of suspension (in his terminology, withheld belief) 
that is essentially normative.23 In doing so, he uses a strategy similar to 
                                                        
23 In the previous section, I outlined a potential difference between suspension and withheld assent. 
Introducing a new term at this stage, ‘withheld belief’, would only generate confusion. However, 
when Engel mentions ‘withheld belief’, it’s quite clear that he is talking about our notion of 
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Sosa’s, in the sense that he begins with a more fundamental theory of belief, 
and attempts to extend this theory to account for suspension. The main 
difference in their approaches thus reflects the difference between 
teleological and normative theories of belief generally—for Engel, the 
nature and normativity of suspension, like that of belief, cannot be reduced 
to descriptive features of believers, unlike on the teleological view.  
In response to Mayo’s contention that normative theories of belief cannot 
account for suspension (outlined in Section 2.1.), Engel writes: 
‘It is false that the norm of truth allows only two doxastic attitudes. If one 
considers whether p is true, and does not have enough evidence for either 
p or not-p, the norm does not prescribe believing p or believing not-p. It 
prescribes withholding belief. But isn’t withholding belief then under the 
governance of the evidential norm…? It is, but it is also under the 
governance of the truth norm, for there is no possibility of being governed 
by the truth norm unless one follows the evidential norm.’ (p. 213) 
In this passage, the suggestion is that belief’s truth norm (as captured by 
the normative thesis) gives rise to an evidential norm, which in turn has the 
resources to account for suspension. In this respect, much like how Sosa 
begins with a fundamental aim of belief and derives a secondary aim of 
suspension, Engel begins with a fundamental norm of belief and derives a 
secondary norm (an evidential norm) of suspension. What we want to know 
is whether this approach to understanding suspension is more effective 
than that of the teleologists. My method is again to consider whether the 
condition offered—that of an evidential norm—is both necessary and 
sufficient for suspension. 
                                                        
suspension. With this in mind, I will continue to talk about suspension in the text, but will not edit 
Engel’s references to ‘withheld belief’—these two terms should thus be considered interchangeable. 
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2.3.1. THE SUFFICIENCY CONDITION 
It’s important to keep in mind here that the evidential norm we are dealing 
with, is one that has been derived from the more fundamental truth norm of 
belief. When delineated as such, it’s apparent that such an evidential norm 
is not sufficient to distinguish suspension from, in particular, non-belief.  
Engel informs us that belief’s truth norm doesn’t only prescribe outright 
beliefs, but that via the evidential norm it also ‘prescribes withholding 
belief’. This is because, when we do not have enough evidence for p or not-
p, we should, according to the truth norm, avoid holding a belief on the 
matter, lest our belief be false. However, given that this is an essentially 
normative requirement, and not a constraint on how we in fact go about 
forming and maintaining beliefs, we can simply note that this requirement 
is satisfied by remaining in (or entering into) a state of non-belief. On the 
surface, there is no reason to suppose that the truth norm prescribes 
anything other than non-belief, even when a subject has considered a 
proposition and determined the evidence for and against it to be 
insufficient. Both states equally allow a subject to avoid violating the 
fundamental requirement of the truth norm, which is to believe only truths. 
In essence, the worry is that, from the proposed evidential norm, we are 
told nothing about the difference between suspension and non-belief. In 
contrast, this is not true of how the normativists distinguish beliefs from 
other attitudes, such as, say, imaginings. Normativism tells us that belief 
just is the attitude that is subject to a truth norm—a condition that is not 
true of imaginings (it is perfectly acceptable to have false imaginings); so 
imaginings are not beliefs. But we do not get a similar contrast between 
suspension and non-belief on the basis of Engel’s evidential norm. The very 
reason, we are told, that we are committed to the evidential norm is to serve 
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the truth norm. That is, to avoid forming false beliefs—but we can achieve 
this whether we are suspending or in a state of non-belief.24 
For the normativists, the way around this problem is to claim that the 
evidential norm requires suspension (as opposed to non-belief) under 
certain evidential conditions. In fact, this appears to be what Engel has in 
mind when he writes that suspension is ‘under the governance of the truth 
norm, for there is no possibility of being governed by the truth norm unless 
one follows the evidential norm’. The point appears to be that, given the 
evidential norm, we must suspend when that is what the evidence 
demands. That is, we must form some attitude that accords with our 
evidence, given the requirements of the truth norm and its connection to 
evidential reasoning. Nonetheless, while believing according to our 
evidence might be essential for holding true beliefs, it’s still unclear why 
the norm requires us to do anything when our evidence is insufficient to 
establish the truth.  
Let’s agree with the claim that we cannot conform our beliefs to the 
requirements of the truth norm, unless we believe according to our 
evidence. In this sense, we must follow an evidential norm if we are to 
satisfy the truth norm. On this assumption, evidential considerations are 
essential to the normativity of belief. However—and this is the difficulty—
even if believing the evidence is essential to believing truths, such that some 
amount of evidential normativity flows from the truth norm, still nothing 
follows about what attitude we are required to hold when the evidence is 
insufficient to establish a truth; nothing, that is, besides not holding an outright 
belief. In other words, if believing only truths is the fundamental norm of 
belief, then there is no requirement (derivative of this norm) to do anything 
at all when, by your own lights, you are unable to believe a truth.  
                                                        
24 Despite the difficulties mentioned in the previous section, the teleologists arguably fare better with 
this distinction between suspension and non-belief. The teleologists at least put a descriptive 
constraint on suspension that is not present when a subject is in a state of non-belief (that is, doxastic 
forbearance). The question, as we have seen, is whether this constraint really necessitates 
suspension—I’ve argued that it does not. 
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To press the point with an analogy: suppose that you are playing a ball 
game, such that the norm for taking a penalty is that you should take the 
penalty only if you think you can score. From the requirement that thinking 
you can score is necessary for taking the penalty, it does not follow that you 
should do anything (such as kick the ball half way) if you do not think you 
can score. In that situation, it follows that you, in fact, should not take the 
penalty. That is, you should not undergo any performance with regards to 
taking the penalty. The truth norm of belief is similar to this norm of taking 
a penalty in the following way. It gives us no reason to do anything if we 
do not take ourselves to be in a position to satisfy its requirement—and this 
fact remains the same even if we accept that we must believe according to 
our evidence in order to believe only truths. For this reason, we can accept 
Engel’s point that satisfying the truth norm requires us to believe the 
evidence, while still rejecting the proposed implication that this evidential 
norm would ever be able to distinguish the normative requirements of 
suspension and non-belief. All that the evidential norm requires, when it is 
described as being in the service of the truth norm, is that we must not hold 
beliefs for which we have insufficient evidence.25 
This demonstrates that there is an important disconnect between the 
alleged truth norm of belief and the normativity of suspension. If we are to 
explain suspension as an essentially normative attitude, then the 
normativity cannot be derived from a more fundamental truth norm.26 
                                                        
25 It is worth noting that Engel’s account arguably fares better with the distinction, raised as an 
objection to the teleologists, between suspension and withheld assent. Engel (2013a, p. 213) 
characterises the evidential norm as the requirement to suspend belief when we do ‘not have enough 
evidence for either p or not-p’. Assuming that this is true of suspension, the normative requirement 
for withholding assent is, perhaps, distinct. For instance, we ought to withhold assent when we do 
not understand the proposition in question. In this sense, a normative requirement could, in 
principle, demarcate between suspension and withheld assent, in a way that ‘doxastic forbearance’, 
on the teleological account, does not. Nonetheless, we would still need a more precise account of the 
normativity of withheld assent—an interesting project in its own right. 
26 It might be suggested that Engel can supplement his normative theory by stipulating that, insofar 
as one forms a doxastic attitude towards p, when the evidence is indeterminate between p and not-p, 
then this attitude is one of suspension. In this respect, we stipulate that the truth norm (and the norms 
that we can derive from that norm) apply only to doxastic attitudes, thus demarcating between 
suspension and non-belief. The problem with this, however, is that, while it might aid our 
understanding of the normative dimensions of belief, it completely fails with regard to the 
descriptive ambitions of belief theorists. Normatively, there is something to be said for the claim 
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2.3.2. THE NECESSITY CONDITION 
Finally, I want to assess whether an evidential norm, of the kind proposed 
by Engel, is necessary for suspension. A good place to start is with the 
problems that the teleologists encountered, with their suggestion that 
suspension is subject to a necessary aim. This will also allow for a contrast 
between the two theories, since the normativism appears to fare better with 
these particular objections. 
The first problem for the teleologists, was the possibility of entering into 
suspension by non-standard means. The kinds of cases that undermine 
their position are, for instance, a neuroscientist inducing states of 
suspension and Swampman coming into existence already suspending. The 
reason these cases are problematic for the teleologists is that they put 
descriptive constraints on how a subject can enter into a state of suspension 
(they must carry out an aim)—but these constraints are easily circumvented 
by such cases. However, as the normativists do not put descriptive 
constraints on how we suspend, it doesn’t matter how we enter into a state 
of suspension. What matters is that the state we are in, however we got into 
it, is characterised by an essential norm. In this sense, it is irrelevant whether 
a neuroscientist arbitrarily forces you to suspend, or whether you are a 
Swampman, your state of suspension can still be subject to a normative 
requirement, such that it is wrong in relation to your evidence. For this 
reason, the normativists have no trouble with instances of suspension that 
occurred via non-standard means. 
Similarly, the normativists do not have much trouble dealing with the 
possibility of suspending for pragmatic reasons. If pragmatic reasons can 
influence suspension, in the way that McHugh (2012, 2015) suggests, then 
it looks like not all instances of suspension are characterised by an evidential 
                                                        
suspension is subject to an evidential requirement in a way that non-belief is not. But descriptively, 
if we want our theory (whether teleological or normative) to distinguish doxastic attitudes from other 
types of attitudes (or, as the case may be, the absence of an attitude), then we cannot—on pain of 
circularity—stipulate that our theory applies only to doxastic attitudes. (Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for motivating me to elaborate on this issue.) 
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aim, as the teleologists claim. Sometimes pragmatic aims can motivate us to 
suspend.27 However, it is perfectly consistent with the normativists’ 
position to agree that there are instances of suspension that are motivated 
by pragmatic aims, while at the same time holding that these instances are 
characterised by an (independent) normative requirement, such that they 
are always incorrect (because they violate the evidential requirement of the 
norm of suspension). This would allow for instances of suspension formed 
for pragmatic reasons, but would simply deny that it would ever be correct 
to suspend for such reasons—not an entirely implausible claim.28 In 
contrast, the teleologists do not have this option, since they characterise 
suspension by the aims that motivates suspension. They cannot, that is, hold 
that there is a necessary evidential aim of suspension, while at the same 
time allowing that, in fact, we sometimes aim to suspend for pragmatic (and 
not evidential) reasons. The difference here between the teleologists and the 
normativists, again reflects the fact the teleologists put descriptive 
constraints on how we suspend, while the normativists do not. 
So, is there a problem with Engel’s suggestion that there is a necessary 
evidential norm of suspension? On one level, there isn’t—I don’t wish to 
deny that suspension is subject to some kind of evidential normativity. 
Instead, the issue I do want to raise is that—even if we agree that there is 
an evidential norm of suspension—it cannot be the case that this norm is 
derived, as Engel claims, from a more fundamental truth norm. As we have 
seen, the evidential norm, insofar as the truth norm gives rise to one, does 
not in turn provide us with conditions for suspension, over and above mere 
non-belief. As noted, we can satisfy that evidential norm by simply not 
believing. For this reason, we can agree that certain normative requirements 
apply to suspension, but maintain that these requirements cannot be 
derived from a more fundamental truth norm of belief, and therefore cannot 
                                                        
27 As per McHugh’s case of the guilty friend, discussed above in Section 2.2.2. 
28 It is not a stretch to think that you have committed some kind of error when, despite convincing 
evidence that your friend is guilty, you decide to suspend belief on the matter, just because he is your 
friend.  
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be necessary for suspension in the proposed sense. To argue otherwise, and 
to insist that we must go through the truth norm to reach suspension’s 
evidential norm, would in effect be to accept that there is nothing more to 
suspension, neither descriptively nor normatively, than non-belief—a claim 
that would be in direct contradiction with the requirements that we set for 
a theory of suspension in the beginning. In other words, whatever the 
essential normativity of suspension, it must be able to distinguish 
suspension from non-belief; which is a requirement Engel’s norm fails to 
meet. 
My aim in this paper has been to consider whether different interpretations 
of belief’s aim—the teleological and normative accounts—can explain the 
descriptive and normative features of suspension. If what I have said is 
correct, then they cannot—theorists on neither side of the theoretical divide 
have successfully shown how their theories can account for suspension, 
even when those theories are explicitly extended to do so. In closing, I wish 
to say a few words about what, I think, we should make of this conclusion. 
3. CLOSING REMARKS 
It seems that we are left with two options. We can either take the failure of 
the above theories to account for suspension as a failure of those theories, 
or we can give up on the assumption that these theories ought to account 
for suspension. According to this latter option, it might be better to 
characterise suspension as an altogether different kind of attitude from 
belief.  
Clearly the intuitions of the theorists discussed in this paper are that 
theories of belief ought to be able to account for suspension, such that we 
should remain committed to our initial assumption. It is precisely this 
assumption that gives rise to the problem of accounting for suspension in 
the first place. This is no doubt because of the close descriptive and 
normative relations that belief and suspension do, as a matter of fact, share. 
For instance, as I have mentioned earlier, the belief that p seems to rule out 
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suspension towards p, at least in conscious awareness. Furthermore, both 
beliefs and suspension are responsive in apparently similar ways to 
evidential reasons. While the belief that p requires a sufficient level of 
evidence supporting p, suspension towards p occurs prior to the evidential 
threshold for belief being reached, with some important caveats.29 Together, 
these kinds of relations do seem to support the intuition that belief and 
suspension occupy the same theoretical landscape, and that suspension 
should, therefore, be subsumed under a theory of belief. Despite these 
considerations, however, there are also some tempting reasons to abandon 
this assumption. The possibility that suspension is an attitude of its own 
kind also has some merit, and this idea is beginning to show precedence in 
the developing literature.30 
The first thing worth noting is the general success of the established 
teleological and normative theories of belief when it comes to explaining 
outright belief. Both approaches—the problem of suspension 
notwithstanding—have the potential to account for many features of belief, 
as they were originally intended. Probably the two most crucial aspects of 
these theories are their proposed ability to do the descriptive work of 
demarcating beliefs from other attitudes, and the normative work of 
explaining rational belief—each according to an aim or norm, respectively. 
Yet these are not the only benefits that have been associated with these 
theories. The suggestion that belief is subject to a truth-aim or -norm has 
been offered as an explanation of doxastic involuntarism (Williams 1973), 
as an explanation of exclusivity and transparency (Shah 2003 and Steglich-
Petersen 2006, 2008), and as an essential component to our understanding 
of knowledge (McHugh 2011 and Wedgwood 2002). So, while these 
theories face some problems, they also promise to generate a lot of 
theoretical success when they are not specifically focused on suspension. 
This should therefore make us think twice before abandoning them in light 
                                                        
29 This paper could in fact be construed as a discussion of the inability of the teleological and 
normative approaches to explain what these important caveats are. 
30 For instance, see Booth (2014) and Friedman (2013, 2017). 
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of the concerns raised in this paper. If we did decide to abandon these 
theories, in pursuit of theories of belief that also explain suspension, the task 
at hand would not only be to find an alternative theory that is capable of 
accounting for suspension, but one that is capable of doing this additional 
theoretical work as well. Indeed, the underlying difficulty is perhaps that 
there cannot be a single theory that is capable of explaining all of these 
features of belief, while at the same time explaining the required features of 
suspension. 
Finally, recent developments in the literature support the idea that 
suspension is, after all, its own kind of attitude. For instance, it has been 
suggested that suspension could be a sui generis indecision-representing 
attitude or an attitude towards a question, rather than an attitude (like 
outright belief) towards a proposition (Booth 2014; Friedman 2013, 2017). 
And another possibility, which I have not seen developed in the literature, 
is that suspension could be characterised according to its causal role (i.e. its 
functions or outputs), which would be consistent with a more broadly 
functional theory of mind. In this respect, perhaps suspension has a unique 
functional role in our cognitive economy. Isolating this functional role 
could, again, give us insights into suspension’s descriptive and normative 
features.31 If any of these different approaches to suspension prove 
successful, then they would establish that suspension and belief are distinct 
attitudes, with the demarcating line being as distinct as that between beliefs 
and other attitudes such as desires, imaginings, suppositions, etc. 
  
                                                        
31 I briefly discuss the functional properties of suspension in [Author Removed]. Undoubtedly, 
however, there is a lot more that can be said on the matter. 
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